Adapted to new KPasswordEdit::password() signature.

This relates to bug 2961.

Signed-off-by: Slávek Banko <slavek.banko@axis.cz>

1 files changed, 10 insertions, 30 deletions

diff --git a/libkpgp/kpgp.cpp b/libkpgp/kpgp.cpp
index 293b3681..a4242957 100644
--- a/libkpgp/kpgp.cpp
+++ b/libkpgp/kpgp.cpp
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ Module::Module()
     mPublicKeysCached(false),
     mSecretKeys(),
     mSecretKeysCached(false),
-    passphrase(0), passphrase_buffer_len(0), havePassPhrase(false)
+    passphrase(0), havePassPhrase(false)
 {
   if (!kpgpObject) {
     kdDebug(5100) << "creating new pgp object" << endl;
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ Module::prepare( bool needPassPhrase, Block* block )
       TQApplication::restoreOverrideCursor();
       if (passdlgResult == TQDialog::Accepted) {
         if (!setPassPhrase(passdlg.passphrase())) {
-          if (strlen(passdlg.passphrase()) >= 1024)
+          if (passdlg.passphrase().length() >= 1024)
              errMsg = i18n("Passphrase is too long, it must contain fewer than 1024 characters.");
           else
              errMsg = i18n("Out of memory.");
@@ -227,18 +227,11 @@ Module::prepare( bool needPassPhrase, Block* block )
 void
 Module::wipePassPhrase(bool freeMem)
 {
-  if ( passphrase ) {
-    if ( passphrase_buffer_len )
-      memset( passphrase, 0x00, passphrase_buffer_len );
-    else {
-      kdDebug(5100) << "wipePassPhrase: passphrase && !passphrase_buffer_len ???" << endl;
-      passphrase = 0;
-    }
+  if (!passphrase.isEmpty()) {
+    passphrase.fill(' ');
   }
-  if ( freeMem && passphrase ) {
-    free( passphrase );
-    passphrase = 0;
-    passphrase_buffer_len = 0;
+  if (freeMem && !passphrase.isNull()) {
+    passphrase = TQString();
   }
   havePassPhrase = false;
 }
@@ -837,34 +830,21 @@ Module::getAsciiPublicKey(const KeyID& keyID)
 }
 
 
-bool Module::setPassPhrase(const char * aPass)
+bool Module::setPassPhrase(const TQString& aPass)
 {
   // null out old buffer before we touch the new string.  So in case
   // aPass isn't properly null-terminated, we don't leak secret data.
   wipePassPhrase();
 
-  if (aPass)
+  if (!aPass.isNull())
   {
-    size_t newlen = strlen( aPass );
-    if ( newlen >= 1024 ) {
+    if (aPass.length() >= 1024) {
       // rediculously long passphrase.
       // Maybe someone wants to trick us in malloc()'ing
       // huge buffers...
       return false;
     }
-    if ( passphrase_buffer_len < newlen + 1 ) {
-      // too little space in current buffer:
-      // allocate a larger one.
-      if ( passphrase )
-	free( passphrase );
-      passphrase_buffer_len = (newlen + 1 + 15) & ~0xF; // make it a multiple of 16.
-      passphrase = (char*)malloc( passphrase_buffer_len );
-      if (!passphrase) {
-	passphrase_buffer_len = 0;
-	return false;
-      }
-    }
-    memcpy( passphrase, aPass, newlen + 1 );
+    passphrase = aPass;
     havePassPhrase = true;
   }
   return true;